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Schizoanalyzing Souls 
Godard, Deleuze, and the Mystical Line of Flight 
David Sterritt 
Columbia University and Maryland Institute College of Art 
Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the 
spirit, the virtual.  
– Gilles Deleuze1 
Spirit…is volatile, whereas the soul is weighted, a center 
of gravity. 
– Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari2 
Mary: Does the soul have a body? 
Doctor: What do you mean, young lady, the body has a 
soul. 
Mary: I thought it was the opposite. 
– Hail Mary 
 
In an article on montage written for Cahiers du cinéma, Jean-Luc Godard 
made an observation that has been quoted many times in many contexts: 
If direction is a look, montage is a heartbeat…what one seeks to 
foresee in space, the other seeks in time….Cutting on a look is…to 
bring out the soul under the spirit, the passion behind the intrigue, 
to make the heart prevail over the intelligence by destroying the 
notion of space in favor of that of time.3 
This passage appeared in 1956, almost three decades before Gilles 
Deleuze published Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-
Image in 1983 and 1985, respectively. Yet despite the distance between those 
dates, the young critic’s remark anticipates key aspects of the philosopher’s 
film-theoretical stance. The need to displace the notional bias toward space 
with a conception of time as a concrete and dynamic force is the single most 
vital element in the thinking of Henri Bergson, whose ideas about this 
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subject – ramified into such areas as affect, memory, perception, language, 
and the ontological properties of mind itself – play indispensable roles in 
Deleuze’s writings on cinema and allied areas of immanence, multiplicity, 
and difference. 
Godard’s statement also resonates with Deleuzian theory in its 
preference for the material (heart) over the abstract (intelligence) and in its 
praise of filmmaking that breaks the “link between man and the world,” in 
Deleuze’s phrase. When a technique of this kind detaches a film and its 
spectator from the “general system of commensurability” that habitually 
orders perception and action in space and time, cinema can perform its 
liberating function of bringing thought “face to face with its own 
impossibility” and animating the “higher power of birth” that this encounter 
can catalyze. “The sensory-motor break,” Deleuze declares, “makes man a 
seer who finds himself…confronted by something unthinkable in thought.” 
Seeking cinematic expression of precisely this – the unthinkable in thought – 
through innovative and far-reaching means, Godard works the assemblages 
of montage and mise-en-scène into volatile folds that reveal, refract, and 
reflect upon their own rich mysteries. Above all he probes the potential of 
the irrational cut, which for Deleuze marks a limit or interstice between 
paradoxically “non-linked (but always relinked) images,”4 producing 
structures more akin to the productive branchings of the rhizome than to the 
arborescent linearity of classical film. 
In this essay I consider ways in which certain ideas developed by 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, particularly in connection with the practice they 
call schizoanalysis, illuminate the 1985 film Hail Mary (Je vous salue, Marie), 
which is actually two films in one – a molar ciné-assemblage, in Deleuzian 
terminology. The longer portion, written and directed by Godard, presents 
the biblical myth of the Virgin Mary translated to the present day, depicting 
Mary as a young Swiss woman who works in her father’s gas station, plays 
basketball for relaxation, receives the Annunciation when the angel Gabriel 
flies in on an airplane, and has a cab-driving boyfriend named Joseph who is 
understandably perturbed when she tells him she’s pregnant. This is 
preceded by The Book of Mary (Le Livre de Marie), a shorter piece made by 
Anne-Marie Miéville that focuses on an adolescent girl coming to terms, 
psychologically and spiritually, with her parents’ impending divorce. 
Sharing the collective title Hail Mary, the movies are connected by a splendid 
irrational cut: the Mary of Miéville’s film is sitting at a table with a soft-
boiled egg before her; a tight close-up shows her cracking off the egg’s top 
with a knife; the severed portion falls onto the table; and an intertitle reading 
At That Time (En Ce Temps La) instantly appears, followed by a shot of light 
rain falling across windswept reeds on a country slope. This marks the start 
of Godard’s film, which slides into existence so softly and subtly that one 
isn’t sure it has begun until the opening credits appear shortly afterward. 
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I’ll focus my attention on Godard’s portion of Hail Mary, which I’ve 
chosen from his expansive oeuvre because it is one of his most intellectually 
and aesthetically adventurous works, and because its complex imbrications 
of narrative drama, theological speculation, Catholic iconography, and 
Protestant music are well suited to the themes I want to explore. One of 
these is the connection between Godard’s highly intuitive cinema and the 
“transcendental unconscious” that Deleuze and Guattari speak of in Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where they declare that a materialist 
revolt against psychoanalytical strictures must rediscover the unconscious as 
an assemblage of desiring-machines, geared not to representation and 
meaning but to the production of desire and “libidinal investments of the 
social field.”5 Another is Godard’s interest in the theologically informed 
psychoanalytical theories of Françoise Dolto, and how this relates to the 
schizoanalytically informed atheology that Deleuze and Guattari espouse. A 
third is the applicability of some central schizoanalytical tropes – 
deterritorialization, lines of flight, nonhuman becoming, and the body 
without organs – to Hail Mary, which deterroritalizes being in ways that are 
physical, metaphysical, astrophysical, or all three. And throughout the 
discussion I’ll be following (sometimes tacitly) the notion of soul as it winds 
through Godardian cinema and Deleuzian theory, often using such aliases 
as virtuality and élan vital and spiritual automaton. 
My goal is less to arrive at a conclusive destination than to emulate the 
strolling schizo imagined by Deleuze and Guattari, scanning the horizon for 
intriguing desiring-machines, spiritual automata, flows of becoming, and 
breaths of fresh film-philosophical air.6 Our guide for this excursion is 
Godard, who attempts in Hail Mary to achieve “an ‘Immaculate Conception’ 
of the frame,”7 by which he means a mode of improvisational practice that 
eschews preconceived framing, selection, and organization so as to open 
fresh frontiers of intuitive perception. The most powerful way to experience 
his work is to follow its flows toward the non-place that Deleuze and 
Guattari describe, “a world created in the process of its tendency, its coming 
undone, its deterritorialization.”8 In other words: find the body without 
organs in Mary’s enigmatic egg; apply the “schizoanalytic flick of the 
finger”9 as decisively as she cracks its macrogametic shell; then watch as one 
story closes and another, surpassingly schizoid tale begins. 
 
God/ard 
Godard was interested in psychoanalysis when he started 
conceptualizing Hail Mary;10 more precisely, he was interested in a particular 
species of Freudian thought, which he found in a book by Françoise Dolto, a 
French physician and psychoanalyst (1908-1988) who specialized in child 
psychology. A member of the Freudian School of Paris who worked 
alongside Jacques Lacan for many years, she developed the very Lacanian 
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idea that beginning in the fetal stage, persons evolve an “unconscious image 
of the body” that constitutes the “symbolic incarnation of the desiring 
being.”11 By the late 1970s she was “the best known and most beloved 
psychoanalyst in France,” according to psychoanalytic theorist Sherry 
Turkle, who summarizes her core contribution thus: “Where other 
psychoanalytic thinkers stressed childhood sexuality, Dolto insists on childhood 
lucidity.”12 
Most important for our purposes, Dolto was also a practicing Roman 
Catholic who wanted “to add a mystical foundation to her thesis of the body 
image,” according to psychoanalytic historian Élisabeth Roudinesco; her 
reasoning was that the Incarnation and the Resurrection, through the 
Crucifixion, “pulled Christ out of a ‘placenta’ and a uterine world to accede 
to eternal life,” allowing him to become “the very metaphor of desire that 
leads humankind…on a great identity quest.”13 Dolto believed that 
“psychoanalysis which seeks to substitute analysis for ‘acting out’ reinforces 
the Christian ethic just as the Christian ethic reinforces the psychoanalytic 
one.”14 One of Dolto’s projects was a series of radio dialogues with Gérard 
Sévérin, another Freudian School psychoanalyst. These were published in 
book form as L’Évangile au risque de la psychoanalyse,15 the text that captured 
Godard’s interest. 
According to biographer Richard Brody, the roots of Hail Mary lie in an 
unrealized Godard project provisionally called Fathers and Daughters, a film 
“about incest” that would feature Godard playing the role of God, an 
“invisible and ubiquitous” presence, opposite the young actress Myriem 
Roussel, with whom he was infatuated. When he ran into resistance from 
Roussel, who was wary of the ticklish material he was coming up with, he 
looked for a more sensitive way of approaching the subject of forbidden 
desire. For a while he considered a story about Sigmund Freud and the early 
patient known as Dora, he said later. “Then, I looked at it with regard to 
God the Father. And I came upon the story of Mary.”16 He also came upon 
Dolto’s work, or at least one corner of it. 
Although the typical Godard film is liberally bestrewn with literary 
allusions and quotations, there is often a surprising murkiness about what 
Godard has actually read, since he is frequently content to cite a work on the 
basis of fleeting acquaintance rather than serious engagement. (No matter 
what appears within a movie, biographer Colin MacCabe writes, “it would 
always be a mistake to assume that Godard had read a particular book.”17) 
This uncertainty extends to Dolto’s work. Godard ran across her book, he 
recalled, 
and in her introduction – I didn’t really read the rest of the book – 
she spoke of Mary and Joseph in a way that I never heard before. It 
seemed very cinematic: the story of a couple. And I’m very 
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traditional. I’ve always made love stories and stories of couples. So 
that’s how I got to the story of “God and his Daughter.”18 
This theme – a couple in love – sounds rather too conventional for Godard in 
the 1980s, and his account of its genesis sounds rather too neat, asking us to 
see him as a teller of tales whose unfettered imagination peers down all 
manner of challenging conceptual byways – incest and taboo, father Freud 
and daughter Dora, God and Godard himself – and ultimately returns with 
“the story of a couple” that is “cinematic” and “traditional.” Is something 
wrong with this picture? 
There certainly is. It will be obvious to anyone who encounters Hail 
Mary that not even Godard could have set out to make a traditional “story of 
a couple” and somehow ended up with the exfoliating schizz-flows of this 
eminently rhizomatic film. Here as elsewhere, Godard’s statement of intent 
is a creative semi-fiction – a purposefully inchoate supplement to a cinematic 
experience that is irreducible to language and unrepresentable except by its 
own intensive singularities. Godard’s films usually do tell stories, but his 
real business is forging a new kind of cinema – a cinema of between and a 
cinema of and, as Deleuze describes it, which “does away with all the cinema 
of Being = is” and makes visible “the indiscernible.”19 Whatever role Dolto’s 
psychoanalysis, or anyone’s psychoanalysis, played in the origin of Hail 
Mary is surely outweighed by these grander considerations. 
I don’t mean to suggest that Dolto’s psychoanalytical work exercised no 
influence whatever on the evolution of Hail Mary. Godard was sufficiently 
interested in L’Évangile au risque de la psychoanalyse, or at least the 
introduction, to mention it in interviews about the film; a few of its phrases 
appear in the dialogue; and certain of its ideas are detectable within the 
movie’s intellectual and affective matrices. But while Godard’s limited Dolto 
reading influenced the early stages of his script, the finished film reflects 
little of her thought. (This isn’t surprising. I find her book a naïve and 
superficial work marked by essentialism, nebulous language, and biblical 
hermeneutics that turn into flights of self-indulgent fantasy.) In sum, it is as 
clear as matters can be with a Godard film that Hail Mary was influenced 
very little by psychoanalytical ideas. On this score the authors of Anti-
Oedipus can rest content. 
 
…and…and…and… 
Deleuze and Guattari state that the infinite series “and…and…and…” is 
the very fabric of the rhizome.20 The additive is a concept long embraced by 
Godard, whose films and videos continually strive to erase boundaries and 
celebrate the productivity of paradox.21 An endless “…and…and…and…” 
would be the perfect subtitle for his oeuvre. One of Godard’s closest 
affinities with Deleuzian thought lies in his insistence on a radically intuitive 
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cinema that opens lines of escape from linearity, rationality, and organicity 
and toward the open-ended natural-historical-social multiplicities of the 
transcendental unconscious. This is the non-metaphysical unconscious that 
Deleuze and Guattari describe as  
material rather than ideological; schizophrenic rather than Oedipal; 
nonfigurative rather than imaginary; real rather than symbolic; 
machinic rather than structural – an unconscious, finally, that is 
molecular, microphysical, and micrological rather than molar or 
gregarious; productive rather than expressive.22 
The transcendental unconscious radiates automatic desire, and the subject 
attached to its desiring-machines has “no fixed identity” but is “forever 
decentered, defined by the states through which it passes.”23 Although he 
does not use schizoanalytic language, Godard approaches the unconscious 
as the schizoanalysts do, not as a site for archeology (the psychoanalytic 
task) but as a plane of immanence that forever pulsates with positive desire, 
which can either be diverted into static being or liberated into boundless 
becoming. The idiosyncrasies, eccentricities, excesses, and paradoxes of his 
films are products of his instinctive urge to create a destabilized and 
destabilizing cinema that seeks to purge the sociopolitical unconscious of 
entrenched habits and beliefs. Hail Mary envisions a virtual, intensive realm, 
showing Mary’s desiring-becomings as lines of flight toward the nonhuman 
sexualities of impregnation by spirit and production of intermingling Word 
and flesh, and Joseph’s as matters of the social field, of the codings and 
stratifications that are flummoxed and then vanquished by his intimacy with 
Mary’s deterritorializing flows. At the end of the film both characters are 
again enmeshed in quotidian reality, and the addition of their child to the 
household (…and…and…and…) indicates, as does Gabriel’s valedictory 
appearance to Mary, that they are newly defined by the states through 
which their decentered becoming-souls have passed and are continuing to 
pass. 
“Just as in the New Testament,” critical theorist John E. Drabinski 
observes, “Godard’s Mary is uniquely chosen to make a home with God in a 
world from which the true God has fallen away,24 reconnecting by way of 
his soon-to-be son….The virginal space of Mary…extends to her a social 
economy in which she is an uncanny presence.”25 This is an important point, 
and all the more so because the uncanny in Godard, and in Deleuze, has 
been regrettably undertheorized to date. Exploring it is outside the scope of 
this essay, but I’ll append two statements that I find illuminating in this 
regard. The first is Martin Heidegger’s remark in Being and Time that 
“uncanniness pursues Da-sein and threatens its self-forgetful lostness.”26 
The second comes from Robert Mugerauer’s gloss of Heidegger’s point: 
“[T]he uncanny is liberating for us because in it and through it we can be 
called to and find a way to recover what has gone missing, to come back into 
what is our own and to find a new ground in place of the groundlessness of 
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the they.”27 This is the ground that Mary and Joseph are recovering at the 
end of Hail Mary, and that their uncanny child is discovering in ways that 
are radically inflected by his uncanniness. “The big error, the only error,” 
Deleuze has said, “would be to believe that a line of flight consists of fleeing 
life; a flight into the imaginary, or into art. But to flee [fly] on the contrary, is 
to produce the real, to create life, to find a weapon.”28 This is exactly what 
Mary and Joseph have done, and what their child will continue to do. As his 
counterpart in the Bible says, “Think not that I am come to send peace on 
earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword.”29 A weapon. 
 
A Euclidean postulate 
There was a certain democracy in those great Protestant families 
that I come from and that left me the time to find, by myself, that in 
fact it is not the body that has a soul. And I found that line in 
Artaud, in which, by a simple play on words, he posits, like a 
theorem, a Euclidean postulate: “I want the soul to be body, so they 
won’t be able to say that the body is soul, because it will be the soul 
which is body.”30 
- Jean-Luc Godard 
 Turning to the above-quoted statement by Deleuze that subjectivity “is 
never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual,” and bearing 
in mind Deleuze’s high regard for Godard, who explicitly addresses 
questions of soul in Hail Mary, we may ask whether the two film-
philosophers have the same sort of thing in mind when “soul” comes into 
their discourse. Clearly neither is referring to conventional beliefs of 
traditional religions. “I’m not a religious person, but I’m a faithful person,” 
Godard has said. “I believe in images.”31 Although the positions of Deleuze 
and Guattari vis-à-vis the spiritual are complex, some indications can be 
gleaned from their statement in What Is Philosophy? that atheism “is not a 
drama but the philosopher’s serenity and philosophy’s achievement. There 
is always an atheism to be extracted from a religion.”32 Such declarations 
notwithstanding, however, Godard and Deleuze and Guattari bring soul, 
spirit, and related terms into play when it suits their purposes, and I don’t 
think this can be written off as careless terminology. Godard has stated that 
while he doesn’t practice the Protestant religiosity which with he was raised, 
he is “very interested” in aspects of Roman Catholic thought.33 And no 
philosopher exercised a stronger influence on Deleuze than Henri Bergson, 
whose metaphysics of body, mind, and soul – of corps, esprit, and âme – leads 
him to say that, “giving the name of Idea to a certain settling down into easy 
intelligibility, and that of Soul to a certain longing after the restlessness of 
life…an invisible current causes modern philosophy to place the Soul above 
the Idea.”34 Some thirty years later he declares that if we are able to get 
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beyond the brain’s restrictive function of attentiveness to the instrumental 
and extensive, “there enters in something of a ‘without’ which may be a 
‘beyond.’…Suppose that a gleam from this unknown world reaches us….Joy 
indeed would be that simplicity of life diffused through the world by an 
ever-spreading mystic intuition.”35 
These are not theistic statements, nor would it make sense to tie Deleuze 
or Guattari to them. What does make sense, I think, is to detect a connection 
between Bergson’s conception of soul and the notion of the body without 
organs. Deleuze and Guattari discovered the BwO in Antonin Artaud’s 
extraordinary 1947 radio play To Have Done with the Judgment of God, which 
concludes thus: 
Man is sick because he is badly constructed. 
We must make up our minds to strip him bare in order to scrape off 
that animalcule that itches him mortally, 
 
god, 
and with god 
his organs. 
 
For you can tie me up if you wish, 
but there is nothing more useless than an organ. 
When you will have made him a body without organs, 
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic 
reactions and restored him to his true freedom. 
 
Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out 
as in the frenzy of dance halls 
and this wrong side out will be his real place.36 
Deleuze and Guattari limn the body without organs as the antithesis of 
the theological body whose unyielding organ-ization, imposed by God, is 
always already stopping up fluxes, draining off flows, squashing intensities, 
and blocking becomings at every pass. “[T]he system of the judgment of 
God,” Deleuze and Guattari assert, “the theological system, is precisely the 
operation of He who makes an organism…because He cannot bear the BwO, 
because He pursues it and rips it apart so He can be first, and have the 
organism be first.” The organism is “a phenomenon of accumulation, 
coagulation, and sedimentation” that strangles the BwO with “forms, 
functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized 
transcendences.”37 The body without organs is a fundamental trope of 
schizoanalysis, and it has strong links to schizo-cinema. Films that connect 
the BwO with the viewer-screen assemblage can open up the latter (i.e., us) 
to becoming by engulfing us with affect that, as Anna Powell puts it, 
“undermines spatial and temporal orientation and unravels symbolic 
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hierarchies….Slumped in our cinema seat, or in front of the domestic screen, 
our customary mind/body maps become fluid and perceptive BwOs.”38  
The body without organs is related to the theory of thought that 
Deleuze and Guattari encapsulate in What Is Philosophy? when they present a 
tripartite schema of disciplines and their productions –philosophy/concepts, 
art/affects, science/functives – whose criss-crossing interactions culminate 
at points where “[e]ach created element on a plane calls on other 
heterogeneous elements, which are still to be created on other planes: 
thought as heterogenesis.”39 This is a discursive way of expressing the concept 
of chaosmos, a portmanteau word borrowed originally from James Joyce and 
referring to the interchangeability of cosmos and chaos, order and disorder. 
The body without organs is surely a chaosmic being – a concatenation of 
plateaus, a “component of passage” that is “always swinging between the 
surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free.” It is “that which one 
desires and by which one desires.” It is “nonstratified, unformed, intense 
matter, the matrix of intensity, intensity = 0; but there is nothing negative 
about that zero.”40 It is “the body without an image,” on which “the 
proportions of attraction and repulsion…produce, starting from zero, a 
series of states in the celibate machine; and the subject is born of each state in 
the series, is continually reborn of the following state…consuming-
consummating all these states that cause him to be born and reborn.” And it 
is the “intense…tantric egg.”41 
 It is also a hazy, mysterious presence in Hail Mary, evoked in subtle 
ways that are all the more striking by virtue of the fortuitous nature of their 
congruity with schizoanalytic discourse. Perhaps it’s the tantric egg, “the full 
egg before…the organization of the organs,” that closes The Book of Mary and 
opens the chaosmos of Godard’s film, in which Mary’s indiscernible ovum 
plays a pivotal role. (Deleuze and Guattari: “There is a fundamental 
convergence between…the biological egg and the psychic or cosmic egg.”42) 
Maybe the non-negative zero is what we see in the 10 on Mary’s basketball 
jersey, or maybe it’s what we hear when Gabriel accosts Joseph with the 
words, “What’s the common denominator between zero and Mary? Mary’s 
body!” (Maybe we also sense it when he calls Joseph an “Asshole!”) More 
substantially, it is surely the body without organs that pulses within the 
deterritorialized flows of soul-body-becoming when Mary endures a night 
of solitary schizo-orison before the birth of her child, wracked with delirium 
as her soul and body pass through the molecular deaths and micrological 
births of dis-organized desiring-machinic parturition. The schizoanalysts use 
Artaud’s vision to exemplify a “destratified, decoded, deterritorialized” 
body, consisting exclusively of “connection of desires, conjunction of flows, 
continuum of intensities”43 that escape the judgment of God across and 
upon the plane of immanence. Godard uses it to crystallize a cinema of 
frameless images, of immaculate signs, of the “process of making nature 
possible,” and of the univocity of metaphor and actuality.44 “Reason is 
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always a region,” Deleuze declares, “carved out of the irrational – not 
sheltered from the irrational at all, but traversed by it and always defined by 
a particular kind of relationship among irrational factors. Underneath all 
reason lies delirium, and drift.”45 Like him, Godard sees delirium and drift 
as entirely positive qualities that proffer our best hope for freeing our 
machinic flows from stifling cultural categories and liberating them into 
torrents of untrammeled love and productive desire. 
 
Conceptual personae 
The particularities of style in Je vous salue, Marie are of course crucial in 
conveying the affects and ideas that Godard has on his mind. One of his 
starting points for the film was his wish to juxtapose “Catholic images and 
Protestant music,”46 not as harmonious consorts but as contrapuntal 
elements in dialogue with each other and with the movie’s larger 
deterritorializing objectives. “I knew that the only music that would work 
would be Bach,” he said in 1985. “And it couldn’t have been Beethoven, or 
Mozart, because historically Bach was the music of Martin Luther. 
And…Luther was attacking the Catholic church, specifically the way the 
church makes images.”47 Expanding on the theme of Bach’s uniqueness, 
critic Charles Warren writes that the composer’s music evokes “a grasp of 
the things of the universe in their essentials and essential relations, and as 
they may, on principle, be recombined….Bach is thus in accord not so much 
with law as with an unaccountable, personlike spirit at the heart of things.”48 
Warren makes no mention of Deleuze or Guattari, but the “spirit” he alludes 
to sounds very like what they call the conceptual persona, the “something else, 
somewhat mysterious, that appears from time to time or that shows through 
and seems to have a hazy existence halfway between concept and 
preconceptual plane, passing from one to the other.”49 The sound and spirit 
of Bach in Hail Mary serve wonderfully as conceptual personae, as 
“fluctuating figures who…express qualities or perspectives that want to 
become-other, to deterritorialize towards another plane by constructing its 
concepts,” in theorist D.N. Rodowick’s words.50  
 Similar things can be said about the painterly impulses in Hail Mary. 
Filmmaking is “like painting,” Godard told me in 1994, “but it’s also 
different from painting, because you use not just space but time.”51 Film 
scholar Sally Shafto points out that Godard has often presented himself as a 
cinematic painter, playing down the collaborative nature of filmmaking and 
thereby promoting the filmmaker’s work as a “solitary and divine creative 
act.” The painterly aspects of Hail Mary also mirror his respect for 
Renaissance Catholicism, which responded to Luther’s faith in words by 
reaffirming the power of images; this inspired Godard’s remark that Luther 
reformed not only the church but also the audiovisual domain. God has long 
been an alter ego for Godard, according to Shafto, who argues that he likes 
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to see himself as a “distant as well as omniscient and omnipotent creator.” 
Hence the special vitality of light in Godard’s aesthetic, serving not only as 
the material ground of cinema but also as a symbol of and metaphor for the 
divine.52 
 Turning to the all-important subject of montage, Hail Mary may be 
Godard’s most far-reaching essay in the irrational cut. Destabilizing edits 
occur constantly, and their disorienting effects are often intensified by 
unorthodox camera placements that blur conventional notions of foreground 
and background. The primary narrative, centering on Mary and Joseph, is 
intercut with subplots – Joseph’s strained relationship with his former 
girlfriend Juliette, a Professor’s relationship with a student named Eva – in 
such jaggedly interstitial ways that newcomers to the film often have trouble 
sorting out what’s going on, much less sounding its deeper dimensions. 
These devices turn Hail Mary into a planar filmic entity, a mercurially 
shifting surface that eschews empirical logic and psychological depth, 
instead folding narration back upon itself through faux raccord cuts and 
radical relinkages that transform the arboreal protocols of narrative thrust, 
linear montage, figural representation, and naturalized mise-en-scène into a 
rhizomatic assemblage of ontological conundrums and epistemological 
ruckuses.  
 
Sublimity 
[A] creator who isn’t grabbed around the throat by a set of 
impossibilities is no creator.”53 
- Gilles Deleuze 
The issues I’ve raised and the examples I’ve adduced are far from 
exhaustive; but I think they give a reasonable overview of the territory, so 
that we can now consider a central question: is it is justifiable to claim that 
soul has connotations for the Godard of Hail Mary and the Deleuze of 
schizoanalysis that go beyond the negational, skeptical, and metaphorical 
meanings often encountered in materialist philosophy and art? I think the 
answer is yes, with the obvious caveat that the soul of which I speak has 
nothing to do with that of religious orthodoxy. In the essay “Nietzsche and 
Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos,” which appears in Deleuze’s last 
published book, he writes, “The soul as the life of flows is the will to live, 
struggle and combat.”54 This idea and its ramifications may not equal the 
visionary intuitions of a Saint Paul or a John of Patmos, but Deleuze’s 
reference to soul (not the only one in this essay) reinforces the impression 
that his thinking has drawn close to theological terrain, and may perhaps 
have entered it. If this conclusion seems to go against the Deleuzian grain, 
the reason might have more to do with modernist intellectual biases than 
with the actual trajectory of the philosopher who said in 1980 that 
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if philosophers have spoken to us so much of God – and they could 
well be Christians or believers – this hasn’t been lacking an intense 
sense of jest. It wasn’t an incredulous jesting, but a joy arising from 
the labour they were involved with….God and the theme of God 
offered the irreplaceable opportunity for philosophy to 
free…concepts…from the constraints that had been imposed on 
them.55 
Deleuze may be jesting as well, but if that’s so, the jest has the richly positive 
aura of which he speaks; if “atheism is the artistic power at work on 
religion,” as he said in the same discussion, he has at times been a highly 
creative artist in this field. Godard jests a good deal in Hail Mary as well – at 
times Gabriel is almost a slapstick character – and he does so in the same 
affirmative spirit. He too has known the elation of freeing concepts from the 
preconceptions and prejudices that have so long blocked off their flows of 
infinite becoming. 
 Some critics group Hail Mary with its immediate predecessors, Passion 
(1982) and First Name: Carmen (Prénom Carmen, 1983), as a “trilogy of the 
sublime”;56 the sublimity of Hail Mary takes its most vivid form in exquisite 
nature imagery. Godard’s growing fascination with sights and sounds of 
nature indicates a wish to bypass his individual ego so as to produce 
“virgin” percepts and affects in his films. (Deleuze: “The inalienable part of 
the soul appears when one has ceased to be an ego.”57) The immersion of 
Hail Mary in the natural world extends to its lyric celebration of Mary’s 
virgin body as a sublime substance, revealing Godard’s urge to approach the 
spiritual not through transcendence of the physical but through a passionate 
awareness of materiality; this in turn reveals the ongoing influence of 
Godard’s early mentor and teacher André Bazin, a devout Catholic who 
regarded cinema as the most privileged means of recording the glory of the 
physical world and thereby unveiling materiality as not the representation 
but the embodiment and incarnation of the holy spirit. Godard’s nature images 
exploit the retinal reality-effects of cinema while simultaneously 
segmenting, fragmenting, and collaging those effects into a mosaic of 
discontinuous surfaces, aiming to penetrate the hard shell of material reality 
(perhaps as Miéville’s young Mary shatters her enigmatic egg) and gain 
some glimmering of invisible realities beyond. Along with this eloquent 
fracturing of space comes a profound reconfiguring of time, within scenes 
and among them, transforming chronological-extensive time into 
durational-intensive time – the time of the Deleuzian crystal-image, “the 
indivisible unity of an actual image and ‘its’ virtual image,” which uncovers 
“the hidden ground of time,” the double flow of “presents which pass 
and…pasts which are preserved.” By merging our spectatorial brains with 
the “peaks of present and sheets of past” on the crystalline screen, we find 
that memory, the virtual, “is not in us; it is we who move in a Being-
memory, world-memory.”58 Absorbing this counterintuitive lesson is exactly 
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as difficult (or easy) for us as it is for Mary to realize that the soul has a 
body, not the other way around. 
 
Into the chaosmos 
Another character in Hail Mary who strikingly manifests the Godardian-
Deleuzian ethos is one I briefly touched on earlier: the Professor, an 
unnamed academic from Czechoslovakia who is having an affair with a 
student named Eva and working out a kind of chaosmic philosophy. We 
first meet him in a classroom, where he is explaining his theory that life on 
Earth could not have originated through random chemical reactions. He 
points to a scientific chart, showing a slender horizontal line bisecting a red 
bulge at the center, and says it “can only be explained by 
something…intercepting light at a specific wavelength.” For him, this 
establishes the presumption that what we know as life originated “in space” 
and that we are extraterrestrials as much as we are Earthlings, perhaps even 
more so. “The astonishing truth,” he continues, “is that life was willed, 
desired, anticipated, organized, programmed by a determined intelligence.” 
He demonstrates this thesis by having a student named Pascal work a 
Rubik’s Cube while Eva covers his eyes and verbally guides his choices. To 
solve the cube blindfolded would take 1.35 trillion years, the Professor says, 
but one move per second guided by the eyes and mind can do the job in two 
minutes. 
There is nothing very impressive about the Professor’s notions, which 
have the hollow ring of Erich von Däniken and “intelligent design” 
pseudoscience. Godard is not vicariously pitching theories, however. He is 
schizoanalyzing theory, not using schizo terminology but performing schizo 
operations, such as transforming commonsense instances of either/or 
reasoning – the Earth/space binary, the us/them duality, the difference 
between 1.35 trillion years and two minutes – into assemblages marked by 
rhizomatic intensity and radical multiplicity and indiscernible difference and 
crystalline consistency, mapping escape trajectories of the body without 
organs in all its deterritorializing virtuality. By saying we were born in the 
heavens, which could include Heaven itself, the Professor and Godard take 
us along lines of flight that are incomprehensible to the soul-as-body but 
radiantly clear to the body-as-soul. 
Mary is swept by this clarity at the end of her transformative night of 
spiritual suffering; but as prelude to this outcome her organ-ized theological 
body must be therapeutically twisted, distorted, and wrenched way from 
the desiring-machines that have enchained her to the ordinary human 
sphere. We perceive traces of her becoming-soul in the words of her interior 
monologue, which zigzags rhizomatically between negative and positive 
poles:  
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Earth and sex are in us. Outside there are only stars. Wanting isn’t 
expanding by force. It’s recoiling into oneself from level to level, for 
eternity. You don’t need a mouthhole to eat with and an asshole to 
swallow infinity. Your ass must go in your head, and so descend to 
ass level, then go left or right to rise higher….I’m a woman, though 
I don’t beget my man through my cunt. 
And then suddenly, luminously, “I am not resigned. Resignation is sad. 
How can one be resigned to God’s will? Are we resigned to being loved? 
This seemed clear to me. Too clear.” And a bit later, after her child’s birth, 
“How did He look? What was He like? There are no looks in love, no 
outward seeming. No likeness. Only our hearts will tremble in the light.” 
Only now, and in the film’s final scene, does Mary realize the promise she 
intuited at the beginning: “I wondered if some event would happen in my 
life. I’ve had only the shadow of love…in fact, the shadow of a shadow, like 
the reflection of a water-lily in a pond, not quiet, but shaken by ripples in the 
water, so that even the reflection is not yours….” 
 The supreme act of philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari write, is “not so 
much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, 
unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and 
inside of thought, as…that which cannot be thought and yet must be 
thought.”59 Accordingly, the challenge each of us confronts is to discover, in 
Rodowick’s words, the “thinker within me that is the unthought of my 
thought [and] is…the power to transform life by revealing new lines of 
variation in our current ways of thinking and modes of existence.”60 Godard 
comes amazingly close to visualizing this insight at the end of Hail Mary, 
when Mary hears Gabriel’s last greeting (“Nothing. Hail, Mary!”) and then 
gets into her car and lights a cigarette. She is simply having a smoke, like 
countless characters in countless New Wave movies; but sometimes a 
cigarette is not just a cigarette. Its smoke blurs the borderlines between inner 
(body) and outer (world) as it transubstantiates an ordinary herb into a 
vaporous essence, subliminally dis-organizing Mary’s self in an act of 
inspiration that is both literal and metaphorical. She then draws a lipstick 
tube toward her mouth, almost as if she were testing the Professor’s theories 
with her own tiny spaceship; and indeed, the Professor’s diagram closely 
resembled the inverse of this image, a closed mouth with puckered lips. 
After a tentative touch or two she begins to apply the lipstick, and the film 
ends on an extreme close-up of Mary’s open mouth, so large that parts of it 
don’t fit within the frame, ringed by her red lips but dominated by the dark 
emptiness at its center. 
 One valid Deleuzian interpretation of this shot would lead in negative 
directions: we are looking at a black hole, the part of the white wall/black 
hole facial system wherein the latter element, modeled after light-trapping 
singularities in space, is a territorializing blockage, the upshot of a failed line 
of flight.61 We may also interpret it in positive terms, however – as an 
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instance of what Deleuze calls the “gaseous image, beyond the solid and the 
liquid,” which seeks (like drugs) to “stop the world” and “make one see the 
molecular intervals, the holes in sound, in forms, and even in water” and to 
“make lines of speed pass through these holes in the world.”62 Or we can take it 
as film scholar Kevin Z. Moore does when he finds it the emblem of the 
‘virginal source” of Mary’s power, to wit, her “belief in the body as an aspect 
of mind,” the effects of which we can observe in physical action but can see 
only as “the black hole outlined by the film.”63  
 I incline toward the second and third options, but I think a more 
productive, liberating, and intensive way of fathoming this quintessentially 
mysterious image leads beyond the realm of mystery to that of mysticism. 
Although this subject is more explicit in Bergson than in Deleuze, its 
resonances with Deleuzian film theory are articulately brought out by 
cultural critic Michael Goddard when he understands mysticism as a set of 
practices that actualize a “prediscursive seeing and hearing,” which opens 
an ecstatic pathway to and through the crystalline regime of signs. Goddard 
notes that while hallucinatory and ecstatic experiences can be brought about 
by schizophrenia, drug consumption, and mystical practices, it is only 
through the latter that “processes of recollection can maintain and extend 
their sensory metamorphoses into sustainable processes of subjectivization,” 
formulating time crystals whereby “experience of the unknown, of the 
virtual, can be reintegrated and redeveloped as spiritual 
experiences…without sacrificing their singularity.” Goddard concludes that 
“the ‘spiritual’ or ‘spirits’…can be conceived of as virtually inhering in the 
material world in the form of temporalities, or conversely the material world 
can be conceived of as existing in the spiritual or in God in the same way 
that it exists in time. The spiritual and the material are simply two distinct 
yet indiscernible sides of the same fold.” He adds that a truly crystalline 
cinema must lead back out of the movie theater “into a re-spiritualization of 
life itself, through the transmission of [the] experience via the crystalline 
regime of signs to the spectator.”64 
Godard, the faithful filmmaker who believes in images, would surely 
agree; and so might Mary, who rejoins the quotidian world at the end of her 
story, bringing with her the knowledge of a singularity – a child, a soul, a 
thought, a virtuality, a body without organs, an unprecedented upsurge of 
the élan vital – that promises to deterritorialize the actual in literally 
inconceivable ways. “At the limit,” Deleuze himself observed, “it is the 
mystic who plays with the whole of creation, who invents an expression of it 
whose adequacy increases with its dynamism.”65 In this play there arises the 
intense sense of jest – of joy – that brave philosophers have found by 
pursuing thinking toward the becomings-flows of the infinite. If we share 
this delight it is because, as Deleuze tells us, “the essence of art is a kind of 
joy, and this is the very point of art. There can be no tragic work because 
there is a necessary joy in creation: art is necessarily a liberation that 
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explodes everything.”66 Mary too feels the gladness of creating, and never 
more so than at the end of her tormented night, when she climbs out from 
under the impenetrable judgment of an inexplicable God and says, softly 
and simply, “I am joy. I am she who is joy.” At such a moment the 
unthought in thought, for Mary and Godard and perhaps us as well, is 
tremblingly close to being thought. 
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